- OCR pipeline: Tesseract (images) + pdfplumber (PDFs) → AI text prompt → rule-based regex fallback; works with any text model, not just vision models - Scan Receipt toolbar button parses a photo and pre-fills the transaction form; receipt image is automatically attached to the created transaction - AI settings page: provider, API key (AES-256-GCM encrypted), custom URL, model, and per-user debug toggle that gates the OCR/AI debug panel - Fix CSRF cookie secure=False so HTTP deployments work; add 7-day max_age - Fix attachment_refs missing from _to_response (attachments never appeared in UI) - Fix multipart boundary lost when Content-Type was set manually in axios calls - nginx: raise client_max_body_size to 15 MB, add 120s proxy timeout for OCR - Migration 0005: add ai_debug boolean to users table - Update README and CLAUDE.md with AI scanning docs and architecture notes Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
83 lines
3 KiB
Python
83 lines
3 KiB
Python
"""
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Security middleware: headers, CSRF double-submit, request ID, RLS user context.
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"""
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import uuid
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from fastapi import Request, Response
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from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
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from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
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SAFE_METHODS = {"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"}
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SECURITY_HEADERS = {
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"X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
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"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
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"Referrer-Policy": "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
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"Permissions-Policy": "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()",
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"Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy": "same-origin",
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"Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy": "same-origin",
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"Strict-Transport-Security": "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains",
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"Content-Security-Policy": (
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"default-src 'self'; "
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"script-src 'self'; "
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"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
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"img-src 'self' data:; "
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"connect-src 'self'; "
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"form-action 'self'; "
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"frame-ancestors 'none'"
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),
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}
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class SecurityHeadersMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
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response: Response = await call_next(request)
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for header, value in SECURITY_HEADERS.items():
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response.headers[header] = value
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response.headers["X-Request-ID"] = str(uuid.uuid4())
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return response
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class CSRFMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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"""Double-submit cookie CSRF protection for mutating requests."""
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EXEMPT_PATHS = {"/api/v1/auth/login", "/api/v1/auth/refresh", "/api/v1/auth/register", "/health"}
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async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
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# Always set the csrf_token cookie if it doesn't exist yet
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existing_csrf = request.cookies.get("csrf_token")
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if request.method in SAFE_METHODS:
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response: Response = await call_next(request)
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if not existing_csrf:
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token = str(uuid.uuid4())
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response.set_cookie(
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"csrf_token", token,
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httponly=False, # must be readable by JS
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samesite="lax",
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secure=False, # CSRF token is public by design; Secure would break HTTP deployments
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max_age=604800, # 7 days — survive browser restarts
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)
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return response
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if request.url.path in self.EXEMPT_PATHS:
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response = await call_next(request)
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if not existing_csrf:
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token = str(uuid.uuid4())
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response.set_cookie("csrf_token", token, httponly=False, samesite="lax", secure=False, max_age=604800)
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return response
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if request.url.path in {"/api/v1/auth/login", "/api/v1/auth/login/totp"}:
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return await call_next(request)
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cookie_token = existing_csrf
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header_token = request.headers.get("X-CSRF-Token")
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if not cookie_token or not header_token or cookie_token != header_token:
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return JSONResponse(
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status_code=403,
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content={"detail": "CSRF token missing or invalid"},
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)
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return await call_next(request)
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